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Legal rights and practical effects
One of the characteristic features of European Union law  is its emphasis on rights. Over 
time, the EU has steadily  evolved to become a distinctly  rights-based polity. The origin 
of this development was the founding members’ focus on the four  ‘market freedoms’, 
which were interpreted as fundamental rights: a right to free movement of goods, 
persons,  services and capital.  More recently, additional rights have been particularly 
pronounced in  the area of non-discrimination. The foundational principle, the 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality  (now art.  18 TFEU),  was first 
extended to equality  between men and women, and later to all discrimination  based on 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any  other opinion, membership of a  national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or  sexual orientation racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,  disability, 
age or sexual orientation (art. 21  of the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Other  rights 
have been formulated in  areas like environmental or consumer protection. Increasingly, 
measures pertaining to social policy  have been incorporated in this “rights 
revolution” (Mabbett 2011).  
! 1
By  virtue of its superiority  and direct effect, EU law now vests its subjects with a wide 
array  of rights that  are directly  enforceable – individual citizens can use EU law  against 
their own national authorities. That rights are enforceable does of course not mean that 
they  are self-enforcing. Rights have to be activated – claimed – in  face of alleged 
infringements, and their  nature is frequently  in dispute. The EU provides a 
comprehensive system for rights vindication and dispute resolution, based on its own 
judicial bodies and the judicial systems of the member states. This enforcement 
mechanism  has frequently  been identified as the major  source of the expansion of EU 
rights: private litigants claim  rights derived from EU law  against their  national 
authorities before national courts who refer  such questions to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The CJEU, in turn,  has again and again signaled its openness 
to such rights claims, interpreted EU statutes broadly  and developed novel rights even 
were they  had not been specifically  mentioned in  the legal texts. Many  commentators 
find this judicial development to happen outside the control of electorally  accountable 
member state governments, or  even the political process more proper  (e.g. Stein 1981; 
Weiler 1991; Stone Sweet 2005; Sindbjerg Martinsen 2011; Stone Sweet and Stranz 
2012), and observe that a specifically  European form of “adversarial legalism” is 
becoming increasingly characteristic a regulatory style (Kelemen 2011). 
Empirical research on rights claims, however,  has highlighted an important fact: Not 
everybody  is equally  well positioned to use this system  to give effect  to their  rights 
claims. Rights of standing and access to justice vary  widely  between member states,  and 
not  every  individual with  a valid claim can muster  the necessary  resources to activate 
the legal system and sustain a challenge (cf.  Alter  and Vargas 2000). This suggests that 
there is a potential gap between the availability  of rights and their actual application. It 
stands to reason that such gaps are unevenly  distributed. Whereas in areas such as 
trade, taxation or  competition the potential plaintiffs who stand to gain from rights 
based in EU law are often companies with  the resources to support a  legal challenge, the 
same is not true in areas where rights pertain to individuals who may  be too powerless 
to bring suits in defense of their  individual rights,  such as in cases of consumer fraud or 
discrimination. A similar gap is likely  to exist in areas such as environmental protection 
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were the extensive legal obligations arising from EU law do not necessarily  translate into 
individual rights but rather constitute a  collective interest. In  other words, rights can be 
ineffectual where there is not sufficient private interest  to claim  them, or  where 
individuals do not have standing to enforce a public interest. 
One way  of addressing this gap is to notify  the European Commission of the perceived 
lack of effectiveness of certain rights. Many  rights claims based on EU law are therefore 
addressed to the European Commission in the hope that  it will  employ  the infringement 
procedure, particularly  in policy  areas like consumer protection, non-discrimination and 
environmental protection. The Commission receives about 3000-3500 complaints per 
year.  In 2013, 17% of these complaints related to “justice” 1 and 15% to the environment 
(the two largest policy  fields). Similarly, about a  quarter  of all subsequently  opened 
infringement cases pertained to the environment, by  far  the largest  single policy  sector 
(COM(2014)612:.  7, 11-12).2 It needs to be pointed out, however, that the Commission 
has complete discretion over which cases to pursue. The Commission’s decision to open 
or close a case can itself not be challenged, and the Commission is under  no obligation 
to give reasons (cf. Harlow  and Rawlings 2006: 466-468; Chalmers, Davies et  al. 2010: 
341-342).  In this sense, the European Commission has acted as a gatekeeper to the EU’s 
legal system, at least  for certain types of claims. Ultimately, this can amount to a  form of 
‘docket control’ that  allows the Commission to ensure that the CJEU’s caseload in  these 
areas is in line with  its policy  priorities. The Commission has used the infringement 
procedure widely  not only  to give effect to EU law but also to develop policy  outside the 
legislative arena (cf. Scharpf 2011: 229-230; Schmidt 2011a: 50).
While the infringement procedure is therefore a valuable policy  tool for  the Commission 
– and in this sense it should have an interest in maintaining its “docket control” – there 
are drawbacks to this procedure when it comes to effectively  safeguarding rights. Most 
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1 This area covers cases involving discrimination, fundamental rights and judicial cooperation (arrest 
warrants, enforcement orders etc.). 
2 The proportion of individual complaints as a basis for infringement procedures varies from year to year 
but their importance cannot be overstated (cf. Chalmers, Davies et al. 2010: 333). 
importantly, the procedure is time-consuming. The completion  of the administrative 
phase of the infringement procedure takes on average about four years from  the first 
informal letter  to the referral to the Court, should the procedure go this far 
(COM(2007)502: 5), and the court case itself again adds several months.3  The 
Commission’s addition of measures towards alternative dispute resolution in the case of 
individual complaints (the “EU-Pilot”  programme) will do nothing  to speed it up and 
has been extensively  criticised as potentially  inducing  “complaint fatigue” (cf. Smith 
2010: 156), giving member state authorities the opportunity  to draw out the process and 
causing individual complainants to simply give up.
The Commission itself acknowledges its limited capacity  to provide effective remedies 
for rights infringements, in particular since many  important  measures of judicial 
protection are only  available at the national level: “Only  a national tribunal can apply 
remedies like injunctions to the administrations, cancellation of national decisions, 
damages etc.”  (COM (2007)502: 8).  One of the strategies of the Commission to address 
this problem  has been to introduce measures to expand access to justice at the national 
level, not only  by  granting wider  rights of standing and legal aid to individuals, but in 
particular to interest groups acting in the interest of the public. Support by  interest 
groups for rights claims has been shown to have a  significant influence on outcomes (cf. 
Cichowski 2004; Cichowski 2006; Conant 2006; Slepcevic 2009). Where litigants could 
draw on the support of organised interests, rights claims were more likely  to be 
successful than where individuals were on their own. Interest groups active in areas 
such  as environmental protection, moreover, can pursue public interests much more 
effectively  than individuals. Since public authorities can often bypass or  “contain” 
individual rulings (Conant 2002), interest groups can more easily  engage in wider 
political mobilization than individuals in support  of rights claims in order to achieve a 
lasting impact on  public policy  (cf. Alter  and Vargas 2000; Börzel 2006; Cichowski 
2006). 
While interest groups can therefore play  an important role in  giving practical effect to 
legal rights,  the actual ability  of interest groups to lend support  to rights claims differs 
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3 Since many cases are concluded before this stage, the Commission states the average duration of an 
infringement procedure as 26 months (COM(2007)502: 5). 
widely  between member  states. The conditions for  access to courts for  interest groups 
are extremely  heterogeneous and often significantly  more restrictive than those for 
individuals, particularly  regarding standing and costs.  It is this situation that the 
Commission has started to address by  pursuing various initiatives to expand access to 
justice for interest groups in national courts, effectively  forfeiting its gatekeeping 
position. Early  efforts in limited policy  areas such as consumer protection date back to 
the 1980s, but broader  measures aimed at more general access to justice for  interest 
groups are more recent. Since the start of the century  the Commission has repeatedly 
pushed for a  harmonization of rights of standing and introduced measures to provide 
legal aid – with varying success. The remainder of this paper  analyses the conditions for 
access to justice for interest groups in the EU legal system and outlines the various 
efforts by  the Commission to enhance such  access. A final section then takes up the 
trade-off between the Commission’s forfeiture of its role as gatekeeper with its 
concomitant ‘docket control’ and the potential gain in effective rights enforcement.  
Access to justice for interest groups in the European Union
‘Access to justice’ is a  fairly  broad and necessarily  vague concept. The European Union 
Agency  for  Fundamental Rights (FRA) points out that  “access to justice is a concept with 
many  nuances which includes, first and foremost,  effective access to an independent 
dispute resolution mechanism  coupled with other related issues, such as the availability 
of legal aid and adequate redress.”  (European Union Agency  for Fundamental Rights 
2011: 9).  Nonetheless, important legal documents such as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights explicitly  refer  to access to justice.  Its article 47  summarises the main elements of 
the concept: the right to an effective remedy  before a  tribunal, the right to a  fair  and 
public hearing, the right to be advised and represented, and the right to legal aid for 
those who lack sufficient resources. The EU framework in place to guarantee these 
rights for  individuals at the member  state level is fairly  extensive.4  Apart from  the 
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4  Direct access to the Court  of Justice of  the European Union  in  the judicial review of EU acts  is 
notoriously restrictive, requiring  individuals  to show ‘direct and individual’ concern  in the disputed 
matter. For the most part, these conditions are only met when  the individual  is explicitly addressed in the 
EU act in question. This paper is solely concerned with access to justice at the national level. 
general clauses contained in the Charter  of Fundamental rights and the principles 
developed by  the Court of Justice, individual pieces of EU legislation contain  specific 
clauses on access to justice,  such as in the case of free movement rights (art. 31, directive 
2004/38), non-discrimination and equality  (e.g. art. 7, directive 2000/43 on  racial 
equality  and art. 9, directive 2000/78 on equality  in  employment), and the 
environment. In addition, directive 2003/8 “to improve access to justice in cross-border 
disputes by  establishing minimum  common rules relating to legal aid for  such disputes” 
sets certain minimum  standards for  legal aid to individuals in certain types of cross-
border  disputes concerning civil and commercial law (cf.  European Union Agency  for 
Fundamental Rights 2011: 19). The launch of the European Commission’s E-Justice 
portal in 2010 (as part of the European Council’s Stockholm programme) has further 
added to the resources for individuals using EU law to seek individual redress.  
The situation is different for  interest  groups. Rights of standing are more restrictive for 
groups in pursuing litigation on behalf of others or  purely  in the public interest, and 
legal aid is often available for  individuals only  (cf. de Sadeleer, Roller et al. 2005; 
European Union Agency  for  Fundamental Rights 2011; Darpo 2013). Since the cost 
involved in these efforts cannot be recovered, not all  interest groups have the capacity  to 
engage in legal proceedings. The Commission and the legislative institutions of the EU 
have, however, successively  put  in place provisions to guarantee access to justice for 
interest groups, primarily  in policy  areas discussed above that lie at  the intersection of 
private and public interests.  These policy  areas fall into two categories: those where 
individuals may  be too powerless to bring suits in defense of their  own individual rights, 
such  as in cases of consumer  fraud or  discrimination, and those where the interests are 
collective rather than individual, such as environmental protection. 
Where individuals  might be too powerless to bring suits on their own: consumer 
protection and anti-discrimination
The policy  area where questions of access to justice for interest  groups was first 
addressed in the EU was consumer protection. Here, organised interests are explicitly 
assigned a role in EU law. Since the Amsterdam  Treaty,  the relevant  article in primary 
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law reads: “In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety  and 
economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their  right to information, 
education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”  (art. 169(1) 
TFEU, my  emphasis, cf. also Micklitz 2006: 454). Already  in 1984, in  what was the first 
provision for access to justice for organised interests in EU law, directive 84/450 on 
misleading advertising allowed that: “persons or organizations regarded under  national 
law as having a legitimate interest in prohibiting  misleading advertising may  (a) take 
legal action against such advertising; and/or  (b) bring such advertising before an 
administrative authority  competent either to decide on complaints or to initiate 
appropriate legal proceedings” (art.  4(1) directive 84/450). In this sense, entities other 
than the immediate victim  of false advertising were empowered to bring suits for 
injunctions against private companies engaging in such practices.  In the period since, 
the Commission and the EU legislators have expanded this right for  interest groups 
active in consumer protection to seek judicial (or  quasi-judicial) injunctions against 
unfair market practices to many  other sectors of marketing (cf. Micklitz 2006: 455-456). 
Shortly  after  the original directive, the Commission started deliberations “whether it 
was opportune to draft a framework directive introducing a general right  for consumer 
associations to act in  the courts on behalf of the general interest of consumers”  (COM 
(87) 210: 3) so as to create a  horizontal provision for  access to justice for  interest groups 
in  questions of consumer  protection, a  move that was also supported by  the European 
Parliament (cf. OJ No. C 99,  13.4.1987: 203-205). The Commission readdressed this 
question in its 1993  Green Paper  on the access of consumers to justice,  in particular  with 
regard to cross-border conflicts.  Such conflicts were particularly  difficult  to handle 
judicially  where the rules of standing for interest  groups suing for an injunction differed 
between the countries involved. The Commission suggested a harmonisation or at  least 
a mutual recognition of rights of standing  for consumer  organisations (COM (1993) 576: 
79-80). This solution was accepted by  the legislative institutions in directive 98/27  “on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests”. Member states would nominate 
organizations qualified to bring actions for injunctions,  with  the purpose of compiling 
an EU-wide list of organizations whose standing to sue would be mutually  recognised. 
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Such ‘qualified entities’ would include, next to public (state-run) consumer watchdogs, 
“organisations whose purpose is to protect [the collective interests of consumers], in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by  their national law” (art. 3, directive 98/27). 
Organizations can apply  nationally  to be registered. They  are then  screened and 
officially  approved to assure cross-border legal standing (cf.  Micklitz 2006: 462). The 
list is regularly  updated by  the Commission and published in the Official Journal. Some 
countries adopt a broad approach to registration and include a wide variety  of private 
entities, while others restrict the list  to statutory  bodies. Germany, for example, lists 77 
separate organizations, from  broad consumer watchdogs to environmental groups (such 
as ‘BUND’) and local renters associations (‘Mieterschutzbund’), whereas Ireland only 
lists its National Consumer Agency (cf. OJ No. C 115, 15.04.2014: 1-52).
The Commission and the legislative institutions later expanded this general approach to 
supplement individual redress by  allowing access to courts for interest  groups in other 
fields outside consumer protection, notably  in  the field of non-discrimination. In this 
sense, both the Racial Equality  Directive (art. 7(2) directive 2000/43) and the 
Employment Equality  Directive (art. 9(2) directive 2000/78), proposed by  the 
Commission in 1999, contain a clause that  states: “Member  States shall ensure that 
associations, organisations or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with the 
criteria laid down by  their  national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that  the 
provisions of this Directive are complied with, may  engage, either on behalf or in 
support of the complainant, with his or her approval,  in any  judicial and/or 
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under  this 
Directive”. Such associations include NGOs, trade unions or equality  bodies (European 
Union Agency  for  Fundamental Rights 2011: 39). An identical phrase was later  also 
included in two recast  directives on gender equality  (art. 8(3) directive 2004/133  and 
art. 17(2) directive 2006/54).
 
! 8
Where there might not be sufficient private interests to seek redress: Environmental 
protection
The framework envisaged by  the Commission for interest group litigation in 
environmental matters follows a similar  logic, but is based on a different premise. 
Environmental protection is a collective interest, and degradation often does not affect 
individuals in the sense of giving them  an individual claim for redress or damages. In 
other words, the environment is not a  sufficiently  private interest to activate the EU’s 
individual rights protection regime. 
The EU’s current legal regime regulating access to justice in  environmental matters is 
based on the “Aarhus Convention” that was signed by  the EU, all EU member states and 
other members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) in 
1998. The Aarhus Convention deals with access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters and aims to make both 
decision-making procedures more inclusive and enforcement of environmental law 
more effective. It addresses rights of inclusion in decision-making and enforcement to 
the ‘public‘ in  the sense of natural and legal persons, their associations,  organisations 
and groups, including non-governmental organizations promoting environmental 
protection, as long as they  meet certain requirements under national law (Art.  2 para  4 
and 5, Aarhus Convention). As an international treaty, the provisions of the convention 
did not automatically  create new  rights, but had to be implemented by  both the EU and 
the member states.  
The convention provides for access to justice in several respects. In a first step,  the 
rights to information and participation in decision-making procedures are enforceable 
in  court. In a second step, the convention provides for substantive and procedural 
complaints against national permitting processes and environmental impact 
assessments concerning large construction projects (residential developments, roads, 
power lines, power plants etc.). Two directives implementing these two steps in  the 
convention’s framework for  access to justice passed the EU legislative process with 
relatively  little conflict (directive 2003/4 and directive 2003/35 respectively). In a third 
step, the most far  reaching provision concerning access to justice in environmental 
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matters is a general clause mandating that members of the public,  including interest 
groups, “have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and 
omissions by  private persons and public authorities”  (art. 9(3), Aarhus Convention) that 
violate environmental laws. In effect, this clause,  if implemented, would allow interest 
groups to go to court  against third parties, including  private enterprises, that are held to 
harm  the environment. It  is therefore perhaps not surprising that this clause proved the 
most contentious in the process of implementation of the Aarhus Convention at the EU 
level. The Commission’s 2003  proposal for a directive providing wide access to justice 
for interest groups in environmental matters met with opposition in both the European 
Parliament and the Council, despite the fact that it  excluded the possibility  to go to court 
against private entities (cf.  Micklitz 2006: 457; Poncelet 2012: 291). The proposal did 
however state that “Entities active in the field of environmental protection [...] should 
have access to environmental proceedings in order to challenge the procedural and 
substantive legality  of administrative acts and omissions which contravene 
environmental law” (COM (2003) 624, recital 9),  which would allow interest groups to 
go to court against  public bodies,  in particular where they  fail to act against acts of 
environmental pollution or destruction.  In order to qualify  for such access to justice, 
interest groups would have to register in a procedure akin to that for consumer groups, 
the legal action would have to fall within their  statutory  field of activity  and the case 
would have to fall within their geographic field of activity  (COM (2003) 624, art. 8 and 
9). Since the legislative institutions could not agree on the proposal for a number of 
years (member state governments, in particular, expressed concerns for  the integrity  of 
their judicial systems), the Commission withdrew the original proposal in  May  2014 and 
started a new consultation procedure in order to submit a  new proposal (cf. European 
Commission 2013).  
Despite the Commission’s failure to have its proposal accepted by  the legislative 
institutions, several judicial procedures, primarily  preliminary  references questioning 
the national implementation of directives 2003/4 and 2003/35 covering the first two 
steps on access to justice of the Aarhus conventions,  have significantly  expanded access 
to justice in environmental matters (cf. Oliver 2013: 1446-1455). An important case in 
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this regard concerned the question what limits member states can impose on non-
governmental organisations’ rights of standing before national courts in environmental 
matters. In ‘Djurgården’, an environmental group in the Stockholm  area challenged a 
decision by  local authorities to grant permission for  the construction of an underground 
high  voltage power line that had the potential to impact  local groundwater  (cf. Reichel 
2010: 70). The responsible Swedish court rejected the challenge as inadmissible,  since 
the group in question  did not meet the requirements for  legal standing under Swedish 
law. This law stipulated that  only  such groups would have access to courts that had 
carried out activities in Sweden for at least  three years and had a  membership base of 
more than 2000 members5  (cf. Reichel 2010: 69; Jans 2013: 157). The Swedish 
government itself conceded that  the provisions on standing were only  met by  two 
environmental groups in Sweden at the time (cf. Oliver 2013: 1450). On appeal,  the 
Swedish Supreme Court referred the question to the Court of Justice. During the 
proceedings, the Commission took the position that, despite a certain leeway  for 
member states to regulate legal standing, EU environmental law  “grants environmental 
organisations wider access to the courts than individuals. It thereby  imposes further 
limitations on Member  States’ discretion and prevents them  from adopting restrictions 
which undermine”  the objectives of the applicable EU law (as reproduced in  the opinion 
of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston,  case C-263/08, para 55).  The Commission 
therefore considered that restrictions on interest group standing  such as the Swedish 
ran counter  to EU law. The CJEU broadly  concurred. The judges conceded that “it  is 
conceivable that the condition that an environmental protection association must have a 
minimum number of members may  be relevant in order  to ensure that it does in fact 
exist  and that it is active.  However,  the number of members required cannot be fixed by 
national law at such a level that it  runs counter” to the objectives of EU environmental 
law (judgement of the Court, case C-263/08, para 47). The Swedish Supreme Court 
subsequently  granted standing to the organisation and referred the case back to a lower 
court for a decision on the merits. In reaction to the judgement the Swedish government 
adjusted the applicable law and reduced the membership requirement to 100 members. 
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5 Djurgården-Lilla Värtern Miljöskyddsförening, the NGO in question, stated that it had about 300 
members. 
The Djurgården-Lilla Värtern environmental group has since been very  active in 
challenging public construction projects in  the Stockholm  area; most recently  their 
target for legal actions has been the permitting process for a large highway bypass.6
A similar case concerning rights of standing for environmental interest groups arose out 
of a dispute concerning the decision by  a German authority  to grant  permission for the 
construction of a  coal fired power plant in the town of Lünen. The German 
environmental NGO ‘BUND’ contested this decision on the grounds that the planned 
power station would adversely  impact five nature conservation sites in  the vicinity. The 
responsible national court rejected this appeal as inadmissible,  since under  German 
environmental law such decisions can only  be challenged if they  infringe on individual 
rights (cf.  Jans 2013: 159; Oliver 2013: 1452). In the proceedings, the Commission  relied 
on the principle of effectiveness to suggest that the court interpret access to justice 
broadly  (as stated in the opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, case C-115/09, 
para 73, ECR 2011  I-3695). The Court in its judgement  more narrowly  referred to the 
Environmental Impact Assessment  Directive (directive 2003/35), holding that this piece 
of EU law, by  granting  broad access to courts for  NGOs in permitting processes, 
precludes national legislation from restricting environmental challenges to cases where 
individual (and not public) interests were affected (case C-115/09, para. 50, ECR 2011 
I-3722). The German national court  subsequently  granted BUND standing, and in its 
decision on the merits revoked the permit for the construction of the power plant.7 
In response to this case, the German government and legislature adapted parts of the 
Environmental Appeals Act  in November  2012  to grant wider standing for  interest 
groups. The European Commission, however, did not see this response as far reaching 
enough, in particular  since the revised German law placed strict limits on the arguments 
environmental organisations could use in  court  (‘preclusion’). It  started an infringement 
procedure and referred the matter to the Court in October  2013, where the case is now 
pending.
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6 Cf. www.dlv.se, last accessed 2015-02-26. 
7 The plant has since been built, but under stricter conditions. Its operation, however, continues to be the 
target of lawsuits brought by local environmental organisations. 
A third case,  and possibly  the most far reaching concerning access to justice for 
environmental interest groups, concerned the question if interest  groups have a general 
right  to access to justice in environmental matters, despite the fact  that the 
Commission’s 2003 proposal for a  directive on general access to justice for interest 
groups had not been agreed upon by  the EU legislature. The underlying conflict  was a 
challenge by  a Slovak environmental NGO8  against  a decision by  public authorities to 
issue permits to hunt  brown bears, a species that is is protected under  the EU’s Habitat 
Directive. In  the absence of agreement on the Commission’s 2003  proposal, there is no 
explicit  piece of EU law that would grant interest groups the possibility  to challenge 
such  alleged breaches of EU environmental law by  public authorities outside the 
applicability  of the Environmental Impact  Assessment Directive (directive 2003/35), 
which only  concerns permitting process for  large projects. There is, however, a 
corresponding provision in the Aarhus Convention, to which  both the EU and its 
member states are signatories. The Commission’s position in this case is not clear  from 
the documents. The Court, however, instructed the referring Slovak court, short  of 
declaring the Aarhus Convention directly  effective, to “interpret its national law  in a way 
which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the objectives” of the Convention 
(case C-240/09, para 50, ECR 2011  I-1306). In effect, the judges urged the Slovak 
Supreme Court to grant standing to the interest group “in  order to ensure effective 
judicial protection in the fields covered by  EU environmental law”,  especially  concerning 
a species protected by  EU law  (case C-240/09, para 50 and 51, ECR 2011  I-1306-7). The 
Supreme Court followed suit and granted the group standing  to challenge the hunting 
licenses (cf. Vozár 2011: 13; Brakeland 2014: 15). 
The judgement  by  the Court of Justice had widespread effect. National high courts 
started applying its reasoning to allow interest groups to challenge all sorts of 
administrative decisions relating  to environmental matters in a broad sense. In 2013, 
the German Federal Administrative Court allowed an environmental group to challenge 
the city  of Darmstadt’s clean air  plan. Its judgement explicitly  made reference to the 
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8 VLK Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, www.wolf.sk. 
CJEU’s decision in the ‘Slovak bears’ case. In the same year,  the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court referred to the case when it allowed standing for  environmental 
protection groups to challenge permits issued for the 2013  wolf hunt, which  it 
subsequently  ruled to contravene EU species protection laws (cf. Epstein and Darpö 
2013: 258-260).  A year later,  the same court again referred to a general right of access to 
justice in environmental questions when it granted standing to the Swedish Society  for 
Nature Conservation in a  challenge to a forest clear-cutting  operation, a  case that 
otherwise had to relation to EU law at all (cf. Darpö 2014: 388-389). 
The Commission for  its part has used these developments to renew its push for a 
directive regulating a general access to justice for environmental interest groups (cf. 
European Commission 2013: 3).  It  has withdrawn its outdated 2003 proposal, opened a 
consultation procedure and will most likely  present a new proposal in the near future. 
As has happened numerous times in the past, it is accompanying these legislative efforts 
with  a number of infringement proceedings aimed at  enforcing its interpretation of 
current obligations based on previous case law (cf. Hofmann 2013). 
Unrelated to the Aarhus convention but in  effect  following a very  similar trajectory  on 
access to justice for  environmental interest groups are the EU’s rules on liability  for 
environmental damage. Directive 2004/35 sets up a framework that  is supposed to 
implement a ‘polluter  pays’ regime, whereby  the costs of environmental damage, as in 
damage to sensitive habitat or endangered species, are borne by  the perpetrator, who is 
often a private party. The environmental liability  directive contains rules on access to 
justice that  include standing rights for interest  groups. Similar to the provisions of the 
Commission proposal on general access to justice in environmental matters,  such 
standing refers to challenges to acts and omissions of public authorities related to the 
occurrence of environmental damage. There is no possibility  in EU law to challenge acts 
of private parties directly  - such as taking a private polluter to court. In effect, interest 
groups have to ask public authorities to intervene in a case of environmental pollution, 
and where such an intervention is insufficient, interest groups have access to judicial 
review (directive 2004/35 art. 12 and 13).  The preparatory  stages to this directive had 
included proposals by  the Commission to allow for  a much broader access to courts for 
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interest groups (cf. Brans 2005: 97). In its 2000 White Paper on environmental liability, 
the Commission foresaw a possibility  for interest groups to bring cases for  injunctions in 
urgent matters concerning environmental damage. In such cases, interest groups would 
be able to bypass the state and act against the polluter directly: “In urgent cases, interest 
groups should have the right to ask the court for an injunction directly  in  order to make 
the (potential) polluter act [...].  They  should be allowed, for  this purpose, to sue the 
alleged polluter, without going to the State first.” (COM (2000) 66: 22 under 4.7.2.). 
This approach would have been very  similar to the possibility  to seek injunctions in 
consumer law  described above. The final directive, however, does not contain such a 
provision. Moreover, the Commission proposed rules that  would have allowed interest 
groups to recover (some of) the costs involved in  bringing such actions against  third 
parties: “The possibility  to bring claims for reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred 
in  taking urgent preventive measures (i.e. to avoid damage or further damage) should be 
granted, in a  first  instance, to interest groups, without them having to request action by 
a public authority  first” (COM (2000) 66: 22  under  4.7.2.). This,  too,  was omitted from 
the final directive. 
Costs and legal aid
The Commission had early  on identified the issue of the costs of legal proceedings, for 
individuals and interest groups alike, as a major  obstacle for  an effective access to 
justice.  In its 1993 Green Paper on access of consumers to justice the Commission stated 
that “the experience gained in the Member States shows that it is illusory  to provide for 
a right to bring proceedings if the holder lacks the resources required to exercise it. This 
applies to natural persons and legal persons alike. Although the action for  an injunction 
does not provide for  compensation for damages, the association which brings the action 
has to foot the bill (lawyer's fees, expert report, justice) and in  transfrontier cases these 
costs will probably  be prohibitive (quite apart from  the risk of losing the case). Often 
consumer organisations do not even have enough resources to bring actions against 
unlawful practices originating in their  own country, let alone abroad.” (COM (93) 576: 
81). In  the following, the efforts of the Commission to expand legal aid to interest  groups 
remained closely  tied to consumer protection laws, despite the fact that other pieces of 
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legislation (notably  in non-discrimination) had also provided for  concrete access to 
justice for interest groups. Its 2000 Green Paper  on legal aid in civil matters again 
referred to consumer groups when addressing the issue of legal aid to interest  groups: 
“Legal aid could solve the problem  that consumers' associations are most likely  to face 
when trying fully  to take advantage of the locus standi which the directive gives them, 
i.e.  the scarcity  of financial resources” (COM (2000) 51: 7). This carried on into its 2002 
proposal for a legal aid directive. The European Council  had agreed in principle on 
common minimum  standards for such aid to individuals in its 1999 Tampere justice and 
home affairs programme. The Commission expanded on this mandate by  including in its 
proposal an article 15 which stated that  “Legal aid shall be granted to not-for-profit legal 
persons based in a  Member State where proceedings are designed to protect legally-
recognised general interests and they  do not have sufficient  resources to bear the cost of 
the proceedings” (art. 15, COM (2002) 13: 17). This part of the proposal was explicitly 
tied back to the provisions on interest group litigation in consumer protection. In this 
vein, the non-profits the Commission had in mind were “for example consumers’ 
associations“ in cases where the issue at  stake concerned “collective interests rather 
than a mere accumulation of private interests”  (COM (2002) 13, explanatory 
memorandum: 8). It justified this passage by  explicitly  referring to the directive 98/27 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests described above: “That 
Directive empowers ‘qualified’ entities recognised by  the Member  States to bring 
proceedings for an injunction throughout the Community. The possibility  of legal aid for 
these organisations contributes to the objectives of the 1998 Directive” (COM (2002) 13, 
explanatory  memorandum: 8). However, the Commission was unsuccessful in getting 
the legislative institutions to adopt this provision, and seems to have abandoned the 
project since, although  the problem  clearly  persists: “In most  Member States, legal aid is 
not  available to E[nvironmental]NGOs or associations, is only  available in very 
exceptional cases, or lawyers are not keen on undertaking  it  because it  is poorly 
paid” (Darpo 2013: 20).
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Why the Commission supports access to justice
As I have shown above, the Commission has over  the last  years actively  pushed for 
better  access to justice for interest groups,  often in the face of member state resistance. 
As I outlined in the introduction,  this appears to constitute a  trade-off. EU 
environmental and consumer protection laws now  have many  more guardians than just 
the Commission, but  at the same time the Commission’s control over  legal 
developments is now more limited. By  way  of a conclusion I will outline how much of a 
disadvantage to its strategic position can be expected from  a loss of its gatekeeping 
position. 
It  is of course wholly  reasonable to assume that the Commission is interested in the 
effectiveness of EU law. Within the architecture of EU institutions, it is the Commission 
that is assigned the task of monitoring and enforcing obligations arising out of EU law, 
and the Commission uses the respective infringement procedure against member states 
extensively.  But the Commission’s capacities to adequately  do so are often limited. The 
Commission frequently  highlights the added value of the preliminary  reference 
procedure as an enforcement tool, and has done so from  its earliest  annual “Report on 
the Application of Community  Law”: “The Commission's monitoring of the application 
of Community  law [...] must not be allowed to divert attention from  the control 
exercised by  a private citizen who brings an action before a national court (which may 
refer the matter  to the Court  of Justice for a preliminary  ruling).  The possibilities of 
action by  private citizens have been greatly  extended by  the consistent decisions of the 
Court recognizing the direct effect  of numerous provisions of the Treaty  and of 
secondary  legislation. This additional method of control deserves to be made more 
widely  known to the general public.” (COM (84) 181: 4). The Commission frequently 
pointed out its limited capacity  for  monitoring infringements in its justification for 
measures expanding interest groups access to justice, for example in the case 
environmental policy: “As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission uses its 
enforcement powers to address an absence of required end-results. However, the high 
number of infringements, complaints and petitions related to EU environment 
legislation points to a need generally  to reinforce implementation monitoring within 
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Member States” (COM 2012 95: 7). A general deficit in enforcement capabilities was also 
one of the central justifications for its proposal for a  general directive on access to 
justice in  environmental matters: “Furthermore,  the objective of this proposal for a 
directive is to eliminate shortcomings in the enforcement of environmental law. These 
shortcomings have been  demonstrated for numerous years. At European Union level, 
the importance of public participation in enforcing environmental law was stressed on 
several occasions. These shortcomings are due to, among other things, the lack of a 
financial private interest in  enforcing environmental law, in contrast to other areas of 
Community  law  where economic operators require the correct application of legislation, 
such  as internal market and competition” (COM 2003 624, explanatory  memorandum: 
p. 2). 
As such, the Commission’s measures are also a corollary  to its effort to make EU 
legislation more inclusive of civil society  interests at  all stages of the policy  cycle. This is 
evident at the pre-legislative and the legislative stage: “The Commission provided EU 
level access points both  through its significant funding for NGOs and also by  including 
them  in expert groups and consultative forums”  (cf.  Cichowski 2006: 240, cf. also pp. 
201-202). The same also holds for the monitoring and enforcement stage. 
So what about  the Commission’s ability  to use legal proceedings in order  to advance its 
policy  interests (e.g. Snyder  1993; Mendrinou 1996: 13; Rawlings 2000)? Empirical 
evidence suggests that the Commission can use litigation to apply  pressure on legislative 
institutions where they  object  to Commission initiatives (Schmidt  2000; Schmidt 
2011b),  and the example presented above in the case of a  general access to justice for 
NGOs in environmental questions corroborates this view. As the pivotal ‘repeat 
player’ (Galanter 1974) in EU law litigation, the Commission can use Court proceedings 
for ‘rule gain’. In this view, litigation forms part of what Fritz Scharpf has called the 
‘supranational-hierarchical’ mode of policy  making.  This policy  mode permits an  exit 
from the ‘joint-decision trap’ as the Commission can produce policy  change without 
becoming involved in complex bargaining procedures (cf. Scharpf 2006: 852-3). From 
the point of view of the Commission, this opportunity  exists primarily  in its use of the 
infringement procedure, over which  is has full control and complete discretion. In this 
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sense, the loss of the gatekeeper position can diminish its control over an important 
policy tool. 
The preliminary  reference procedure, however, also provides the Commission with an 
opportunity  to present its legal opinion to the Court through the lodging of observations. 
The Commission  intervenes in all such cases and provides its own analysis of the case to 
the Court. Research on Commission positions before the Court suggests that it is quite 
successful in convincing the Court of its opinion in both infringement procedures and 
its interventions in preliminary  reference procedures (cf.  Conant 2007). As shown 
above, the Commission supported the NGO plaintiffs in the ‘Djurgården’, ‘Trianel’ and 
(most likely) ‘Slovak bears’ cases, and is using the outcome to advance new legislative 
proposals (cf. European Commission 2013). Where private actors bring cases and the 
Commission can intervene, it can use its sparse resources to pursue policies in other 
venues, rather than invest resources in pursuing infringement proceedings in such 
areas. This works well as long as the Commission can reasonably  assume that the 
private plaintiffs have similar  preferences. On the dimension “EU law vs. national law”, 
this is undoubtedly  the case in all cases mentioned above. Giving greater effect  to EU 
law is in  this sense a Commission priority.  Whether a congruence of preferences can be 
assumed on a policy  dimension,  however, is less clear. While the Commission, and the 
responsible DGs in  particular,  have demonstrated an interest  in the protection of 
consumers,  minorities, the disadvantaged and the environment, it  is not clear  which way 
its preferences go when there is a clear  conflict between economic interests and 
protection issues. From this point of view, forfeiting its gatekeeper role and providing 
greater access to courts may well go the way of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice. 
 
! 19
References
Alter, Karen J.  and Jeannette Vargas (2000). Explaining Variation  in  the Use of Litigation 
Strategies.  European Community  Law  and British  Gender  Policy.  Comparative Political 
Studies 33(4): 452-482.
Börzel,  Tanja A.  (2006). Participation Through  Law  Enforcement: The Case of the European 
Union. Comparative Political Studies 39(1): 128-152.
Brakeland,  Jean-François (2014). Access to justice in  environmental  matters – developments at 
EU level. Gyoseiho-kenkyu 2014(5).
Brans, Edward H.P.  (2005).  Liability  for  Damage to Public Natural Resources under  the 2004 
EC Environmental Liability  Directive - Standing  and Assessment  of Damages. 
Environmental Law Review 7(2): 90-109.
Chalmers, Damian, Gareth Davies, et  al. (2010). European Union Law.  Cases  and Materials. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2. edition.
Cichowski,  Rachel A.  (2004). Women's Rights,  the European Court,  and Supranational 
Constitutionalism. Law and Society Review 38(3): 489-512.
Cichowski,  Rachel  A.  (2006).  Litigation, Mobilization and Governance: The European Court 
and Transnational Activism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Conant, Lisa (2006). Individuals,  Courts,  and the Development  of European  Social Rights. 
Comparative Political Studies 39(1): 76-100.
Conant, Lisa  (2007). Review  Article: The Politics of Legal Integration.  Journal of Common 
Market Studies 45(1): 45-66.
Darpo,  Jan  (2013).  Effective Justice? Synthesis report of the study  on  the Implementation  of 
Articles 9.3  and 9.4  of the Aarhus Convention in  the Member  States of the European 
Union. Uppsala.
Darpö,  Jan  (2014).  Article 9.2  of the Aarhus Convention  and eu  Law. Some Remarks on  cjeus 
Case-Law  on  Access to Justice in  Environmental  Decision-Making. Journal for 
European Environmental & Planning Law 11(4): 367-391.
de Sadeleer,  Nicolas,  Gerhard Roller,  et  al.  (2005).  Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
and the Role of NGOs.  Emprical Findings and Legal Appraisal.  Groningen, European 
Law Publishing.
Epstein, Yaffa  and Jan  Darpö (2013). The Wild Has No Words: Environmental NGOs 
Empowered to Speak  for  Protected Species as Swedish  Courts Apply  EU and 
International Environmental  Law. Journal for European Environmental &  Planning 
Law 10(3): 250–261.
European  Commission  (2013).  Roadmap - Commission  initiative on Access to justice in 
environmental matters at Member State level in the field of EU environment policy.
! 20
European  Union Agency  for Fundamental Rights (2011).  Access to  Justice in Europe: An 
Overview  of Challenges  and Opportunities. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the 
European Union.
Galanter, Marc (1974).  Why  the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change. Law & Society Review 9(1): 95-160.
Harlow, Carol and Richard Rawlings (2006).  Accountability  and Law  Enforcement: The 
Centralised EU Infringement Procedure. European Law Review 31(4): 447-475.
Hofmann,  Andreas (2013). Strategies  of the Repeat Player. The European Commission between 
Courtroom and Legislature. Berlin, ePubli.
Jans, Jan  H.  (2013).  Judicial  Dialogue, Judicial Competition  and Global Environmental  Law. A 
Case Study  on  The UNECE Convention on  Access to Information,  Public Participation  in 
Decision-making  and Access to Justice in  Environmental  Matters. In  J. H. Jans, R. 
Macrory  and A.-M. M.  Molina  (Eds.), National courts  and EU environmental law  / ed. 
by Jan H. Jans, Richard Macrory and Angel-Manuel Moreno Molina (pp. 145-166).
Kelemen,  R.  Daniel (2011). Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law  and Regulation in the 
European Union. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Mabbett,  Deborah (2011). A  Rights Revolution  in Europe? Regulatory  and judicial approaches to 
nondiscrimination in insurance. LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper 2011(38).
Mendrinou,  Maria (1996).  Non-compliance and the European  Commission's role in integration. 
Journal of European Public Policy 3(1): 1-22.
Micklitz, Hans-Wolfgang  (2006).  Collective Action  of Non-Governmental Organisations in 
European  Consumer  and Environmental  Law: A Mutual Learning  Process?  In  R. 
Macrory  (Ed.), Reflections on 30 Years of Environmental Law  (pp.  451-476). 
Groningen, Europa Law Publishing.
Oliver,  Peter  (2013). Access to Information and Justice in  EU Environmental  Law.  Fordham 
International Law Journal 36(4): 1423-1470.
Poncelet,  Charles (2012). Access to Justice in  Environmental  MattersçDoes the European  Union 
Comply with its Obligations? Journal of Environmental Law 24(2): 287-309.
Rawlings,  Richard (2000). Engaged Elites: Citizen  Action  and institutional Attitudes in 
Commission Enforcement. European Law Journal 6: 4-28.
Reichel, Jane (2010). Judicial Control  in  a  Globalised Legal Order – A One Way  Track? An 
Analysis of the Case C-263/08  Djurgården-Lilla  Värtan.  Review  of European 
Administrative Law 3(2): 69-87.
Scharpf, Fritz W. (2006). The Joint-Decision  Trap Revisited. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 44: 845-864.
! 21
Scharpf, Fritz W. (2011).  The JDT  Model. Context and Extensions.  In  G.  Falkner (Ed.),  The EU’s 
Decision Traps: Comparing Policies (pp. 217-236). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Schmidt,  Susanne K.  (2000).  Only  an  Agenda  Setter?: The European  Commission's Power  over 
the Council of Ministers. European Union Politics 37(1): 27-61.
Schmidt,  Susanne K.  (2011a).  Law-Making  in the Shadow  of Judicial Politics. In  R.  Dehousse 
(Ed.),  The 'Community Method'. Obstinate or Obsolete  (pp.  43-59). Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Schmidt,  Susanne K. (2011b).  Overcoming the Joint-Decision  Trap in  Single Market Legislation: 
The Interplay  Between  Judicial and Legislative Politics. In  G.  Falkner  (Ed.),  The EU's 
Decision Trap (pp. 38-53). Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press.
Sindbjerg  Martinsen, Dorte (2011). Judicial policy-making and Europeanization: the 
proportionality  of national control and administrative discretion.  Journal of European 
Public Policy 18(7): 944-961.
Slepcevic,  Reinhard (2009).  The judicial enforcement  of EU law  through  national courts: 
possibilities and limits. Journal of European Public Policy 16(3): 378-394.
Smith, Melanie (2010).  Inter-institutional  Dialogue and the Establishment  of Enforcement 
Norms: A  Decade of Financial  Penalties under  Article 228 EC (now  Article 260  TFEU). 
European Public Law 16: 547-570.
Snyder, Francis (1993).  The Effectiveness of European Community  Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques. The Modern Law Review 56(1): 19-54.
Stein,  Eric (1981).  Lawyers,  Judges,  and the Making of a  Transnational Constitution. American 
Journal of International Law 75(1): 1-28.
Stone Sweet,  Alec  (2005).  European  Integration  and the Legal System. Institut  für  Höhere 
Studien, Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 101. Vienna.
Stone Sweet,  Alec  and Kathleen Stranz (2012). Rights adjudication  and constitutional pluralism 
in Germany and Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 19(1): 92-108.
Vozár, Imrich  (2011). The VLK Case,  Slovakia,  Application  of Art. 9  Para. 3  of the Aarhus 
Convention  According to the Decision  of the Court of Justice of the European  Union, 
Legal Analysis. Brno, Justice and Environment.
Weiler, Joseph  H. H.  (1991). The Transformation  of Europe.  The Yale Law  Journal 100(8): 
2403-2483.
! 22
